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ABSTRACT
The Internet of Things ecosystem has spawned a wide variety of embedded real-time
systems that complicate the identification and resolution of bugs in software. The methods
of concurrent checkpoint provide a means to monitor the application state with the ability
to replay the execution on like hardware and software, without holding off and delaying the
execution of application threads. In this thesis, it is accomplished by monitoring physical
memory of the application using a soft-dirty page tracker andmeasuring the various types of
overheadwhen employing concurrent checkpointing. The solution presented is an advance-
ment of theCheckpoint andReplay InUserspace (CRIU) thereby eliminating the large stalls
and parasitic operation for each successive checkpoint. Impact and performance ismeasured
using the Parsec 3.0 Benchmark suite and 4.11.12-rt16+Linux kernel on aMinnowBoardTur-
bot Quad-Core board.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 General Description
Embedded applications are rapidly increasing in complexitywhilemaintaining a require-
ment of real-time performance. This stems from growth of the Internet of Things (IoT)
ecosystem and the hardware supporting it. Most platforms within this space do not sup-
port hard real-time as they are derivatives of consumer products such as control gadgets in
unattended environments. The debug capabilities of these platforms is also more compli-
cated since they tend to be headless without a system level user interface and when deployed
cannot be taken offline for debug activities. This deduces debug capabilities to events that
can be easily reproduced on similar hardware that may not be completely identical. Error
scenarios are exponentially difficult to reproduce when long hour testing is required. Even
more so when a best knownmethod of steps to reproduce the error are not available. These
scenarios are best addressed by the generation of application state checkpoints which can be
replayed on similar hardware with replicated or simulated operations from IO devices.
Generation of a checkpointwithin a real-time system requires intricate understanding of
system behavior, resource capacity, and resource bandwidth. Within a hard real-time con-
text, much of this information is known at design time. This is possible in hard real-time
targeted systems due to bounds on the execution behavior as well as additional hardware
capabilities to enforce maximum latency and constrained resource consumption. In a soft
real-time context, this information may be known within some statistical limits and only
limited capabilities for reducing latencymaximums. For instance, TimeDivisionMultiplex-
1
ing (TDM) is common for hard real-time systems. However in soft real-time, priority-based
scheduling and resource isolation ismore common to avoid high latency spikeswhile context
switching, interrupts, other asynchronous events are still allowed. When adding checkpoint
capabilities to a system, there is a high risk of impacting the cycle time or response time of
real-time applications. Themain concerns aremultiple consumers of the data, a dependency
that now exists in synchronizing the checkpoint acrossmultiple application threads, and the
sharing of hardware resources.
This work aims to perform amajority of the checkpointing effort concurrently by track-
ing dirty pages and copying them asynchronously, there by reducing the checkpoint latency
observed by the target application. This starts by tracking the application state, compiling
all state changes into a synchronized checkpoint, and saving off the checkpoint to a storage
medium. The goal is to limit the total observable overhead to the application with check-
pointing enabled. Capabilities can compliment variousmethods of bandwidthmanagement
and checkpoint scheduling. With the interest of improving the ecosystem, the solutionwith
be a software only advancement with reliance on current hardware capabilities found in the
Intel Atom Processor family. While this work is targeted at embedded real-time systems, it
can be applied to enterprise applications.
1.2 Significance of the Problem
As the software industry evolves for embedded applications, multiple parties will be in-
volved in the development and maintenance of IoT systems such that software is becoming
less likely to be designed in-house, and multiple software vendors may play a role in any
given design. Support of these systems requires a more robust debug tool-chain with con-
current checkpoint and replay at the forefront. This will reduce the debug hours spent on
2
potential errors, and the impact observed by the end customer of the product. By regularly
checkpointing an application, the most recent checkpoint prior to an error occurrence can
be provided to a debug team. The debug team can then use the individual checkpoints to
replay and identify the error to develop a fix. When using in-place patching of software,
this method can provide a method of verification and regression to prove a bug is fixed. A
collection of checkpoints can also provide the debug team visibility into a possible use case
that was not identified and addressed at design time. Without checkpointing, an identical
setup is typically required that can be time consuming and expensive to house,maintain, and
manipulate for debug practices. By studying the impact of concurrent checkpointing on em-
bedded applications, the overhead can be better understood as it relates to varying types of
environments and workloads.
1.3 Problem Statement and Scope
Checkpoint and replay of applications has been a classical approach for fault tolerance
and process migration. For long-running embedded applications, it is becoming common
practice for debug. The replay of errors and faults is made possible by restarting an applica-
tion from a known state saved off by a successful checkpoint solution. In a real-time embed-
ded system utilizing commodity hardware, software basedmonitoringmust be used in place
of a hardware based monitoring solution that may not be readily supported. A software
based solution also gives way to broader adoption and evolution much like the operating
system and system libraries. The goal of this work is to research and propose such a solution
for concurrent checkpointingwithin the constraints of amulti-core, multi-threaded, embed-
ded environment where resource bandwidth limitations are observable and measurable by
the software developer. This includes defining an initial state of an applicationprior to check-
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pointing, the methods used to track changes in application state such as virtual and physical
memory, and the cpu state at a point in time for the checkpoint to take place. Most impor-
tantly, the checkpointingmechanism targeted in the researchmust carry out amajority of its
operations concurrently during the execution of applications threads. Hence, there should
beminimal interference to the application’s execution nor should the logical behavior of the
application be altered.
The scope of the research is limited to the various techniques for concurrent checkpoint-
ing including the tracking of state changes, copying the changed state, and replaying from
that state. This excludes a natural improvement that would address monitoring of IO de-
vices for simulating IO responses during replay from a checkpoint.
1.4 Thesis Statement
Using an Intel Atom processor running Preempt-RT linux and a multi-threaded soft
real-time application, the application state changes can be tracked using software and saved
off in a scheduled fashion to enable concurrent checkpointing for future replay. The check-
pointing mechanism needs to have a limited and quantifiable impact to real-time perfor-
mance and the response time of embedded application to be checkpointed.
1.4.1 Objective
To improve the use of checkpoint methods using a commodity grade solution with lit-
tle to no proprietary intellectual property. The setup should closely resembles a simple soft
real-time system, rather than one that meets the requirements of a hard real-time. Real-time
performance is not widely represented by benchmarks within the open source community
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and at the time of research benchmarking suites requiring licenses such as EEMBCwere not
available for use. The re-purposing of an existing benchmark, PARSEC 3.0, should be possi-
ble tomeet the demand of a real-time application and provide demonstration of both overall
performance and response time. The application life cycle should be composed of an initial-
ization phase where memory is allocated and resources are defined prior to aRegion of Inter-
est where the application performs an operation repetitively. During this repetition, check-
points of the application state should occur concurrently with little to no added overhead
to the application. The application state changes are collected and saved off to non-volatile
storage medium to be used for future replay of the application.
1.4.2 Procedure
The hardware selection is aMinnowBoardTurbotQuad-Core board aimed at themaker
community and Internet of Things ecosystem. The operating system is Ubuntu 18.04Min-
imal Install combined with a modified 4.11.12 linux kernel and the 16+ Preempt-RT patches
applied. The linux kernel is configured to isolate 3 of the CPU cores from system interrupts
and scheduling. The PARSEC 3.0[1] benchmark is employed as the testing means with in-
strumentation tomeasure response time of each compute operation and the added synchro-
nization between dissimilar threads. After initialization is complete, but prior to theRegion
of Interest, the application is stalled while an initial checkpoint is created using [6] to assist
in restoring both application and system state during the replay phase. Once resumed, the
application enters theRegion of Interest and the concurrent checkpoint methods begin.
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Chapter 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Relevant Theory
The basis for concurrent checkpoint spans many areas of work with the two ends of the
spectrumbeingmigration of virtualmachines with little to no concept of real-time andman-
aging functional safety under hard-real time constraints. The migration of virtual machines
evolved quickly with the rise of the data center relying mostly on software based solutions
due to the limited hardware support provided by mainstream products at the time. Hyper-
visors began to employ solutions to reduce the downtime ofmigration by copying data prior
to a checkpoint and using dirty taking bits in the page table to monitor which pages during
checkpointmust still be copied. This capability of dirty tracking is supported by Intel Archi-
tectures where a hyper-visor is present. Consequently this hardware advancement does not
work in native more where vitalization is not deployed. Containers begin to take off where
virtual machines leave off since in the case of containers to have the “state” which must be
saved, copied, and restored and unlike virtual machines, no hyper visor is present since the
containerwill run native to the operating systemproviding the service. Focusingmore in the
application domain, there are two prominent solutions being CRIU (Checkpoint and Re-
play inUserspace)[6] and BLCR (Berkely LabCheckpoint andReplay)[8]. BLCR is loosely
maintained within the 3.X linux kernel, due to heavy kernel modifications in order to oper-
ate. CRIU being less kernel dependent is current and stable withmodern Linux releases and
make use of ptrace capabilities for OS State Management. Both solutions provide a means
to halt and application, save it’s state to a storage medium, and restore at a later time on
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like hardware and software. CRIU is particularly useful for debugging complex applications
such as the Firefox web browser since it also supports commonOS state issues like multiple
threads, file pointers, and inter-process socket communication. BLCR is more limited in its
support and therefore was not tested along side CRIU for this body of work. Thus far, the
checkpoint methods mentioned have focused on common desktop applications with little
interest in real-time systems or embedded systems. In the real-time embedded space, most
research has been dominated by hard-real time use cases where deterministic monitoring is
employed. In-order to meet the deterministic nature of the monitoring, all bodies of work
mentioned are hardware based solutions typically monitoring the memory traffic either in-
side the CPU core, or on an external coherent memory bus. These solutions, rather than
monitoringwhich segments ofmemory are changed, seek to track the coherentmemory state
on a per transaction basis. The replay in these systems also trend towards a deterministic so-
lution that can be used to satisfy functional safety needs, thereby running two applications
in parallel, and if one fails or is incorrect, the next frame it can restart from the successful
applications known state. The interest of this work is to evaluate concurrent checkpointing
methods for soft real-time embdded systems, and therefore revolves around advancing the
CRIU solution with advancement when possible from other relevant areas.
2.1.0.1 Hardware BasedMonitoring
Hardware based monitoring consist of techniques that require no additional sets of in-
structions inline with execution code. Many techniques reviewed utilize hardware features
for logging that are saved in buffers or registers that must be moved to memory or non-
volatile storagewhich add additional overhead either through additional out of cycle instruc-
tions or bandwidth requirements on the memory bus. In [20, 21], Tsai discusses a hardware
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monitoring solution utilizing the address and data signaling commonly founding in older
microprocessor designs when the memory hierarchy was separated from the CPU itself. Al-
though in this case a full monitoring solution is provided, a significant amount of data is
sampled on each clock cycle and then used to enable replay and re-execution at a later time.
The value in this research provides targeted logging specific to events and function calls to
reduce the overall logging resource requirements. Implementing this such solution on to-
day’s modern architectures is inherently very difficult due to the speed of executions and
resulting data to capture at this level. Intel provides Last Branch Record tracing capabilities
which allow a user to track basic blocks in clock tick granularity[intelsdm3b]. This provides
tracking for individual threads but with limited buffering since latest architectures only sup-
port 32 entries. Also since the trace entries store clock ticks which are based off a variable
frequency, cross correlation is not possible with neighboring cores on the same die. Work
can be done to enable correlation and use a means to track execution flow but at 32 entries,
the buffers must be record extensively with added check pointing of data in heap and stack.
DeLorean[13] provides a chunk based hardware solution to monitoring with a companion
replay mechanism. DeLorean is the most advances solution thus far when using a hardware
based solution but falls short due to the tight coupling a cpu’s execution units. It also is af-
fected by additional stalls due to howmicro-architectural issues are handled including inter-
rupts, branch perdition, and cache overflow. BugNet[14] also integrates with the execution
units and uses simple checkpoints including minimal information of the architectural state
such as program counter and register file contents. Unlike full check pointing providing a
known state of memory, all first time load memory accesses are included in the monitoring,
removing the need to checkpoint memory. the key limitation for embedded systems is the
hard limit on the replay window the architecture has.
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2.1.0.2 Software BasedMonitoring
Software based monitoring is defined as the addition of instructions that must be exe-
cuted inline that add additional delay to the total execution time. Intel has introduced the
SystemVisible EventNexus (SVEN)[19] in its recent product offeringwhichprovides low in-
terference in the range of 20ns[2]. SVENuses binary storage of 32 or 64 byteswhich includes
a time-stamp and short header. Due to the low cost of SVEN it makes it the ideal candidate
of monitoring real-time workloads withing amulti-core environment. Since SVEN is an on-
die solution it does not directly provide correlation of events in a distributed environment,
but can be extended with logical clocks to do do. ARM provides a similar capability that
adheres to theMIPI® SystemTrace specification[5]. This allows an application developer to
place trace events inline with execution code as a low cost solution to print statements. The
claim of low latency is made but with no supporting data or comparison.
2.1.1 Check Pointing
Li[11] compares two check pointing solutions that satisfy real-time environments by
copying memory contents concurrently. This works by using a concurrent copy thread to
read contents in memory and mark the virtual pages as read only. Therefor, if any write
occurs by the executing thread, a page fault occurs. The small memory system concurrently
writes the checkpoint out to a slowermediumbut forces extended delays if a page ofmemory
is accessed while waiting to be copied. In a similar scenario with large memory availability,
the copying can occur much quicker, but the inherent problem of page faults still exist. The
problem inmodern systems now is that the TLB structures prevent painful page translation
misses that can have large latency. Additionally since the virtual pages are being updated at
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run time, this flow is common practice for self modifying code, which requires flushing of
the TLB structures that further add latency to execution. While Li’s research aims to target
real-time, the allowable overhead is 100ms which is much grater that most real-time respon-
siveness requirements seen today. In [15], a checkpointing solution is proposed that uses
synchronized clocks rather than logical clocks such as lamport clocks and seems to ignore the
checkpointing latency itself due to the nature of the distributed system. In [3] and [23], the
algorithmic cost of checkpointing is managed through an adaptive mechanism understand-
ing both time and energy restrictions on the system. Zhang’s algorithm for adaptive check
pointing targets fault tolerancewhere faults arrive as a Poisson process with rateλ. This algo-
rithm assumes a rollback on fault and repeats the execution still within the deadline. Since
the goal of replay is debug rather than fault tolerance, the correlation of faults could pro-
mote a desired window size to detect faults and use the information to eliminate soft errors
fromdesign related faults. AGDBbased solution also calledDelorean[12], not synonymous
with [13] as a hardware monitoring solution, provides checkpoint and rollback capabilities.
the methods used to reduce memory usage for checkpointing and the most state-of-the-art.
Since DeLorean depends on high speed memory backed storage rather than the slower non-
volitile storage mediums, the usability is deminished for a closed chassis hard real-time sys-
tem. RR[17, 16] is a comparable solution aimed at debugging the Firefox web browser, but
does not provide a checkpointing and replay mechanism safe for live execution for replay at
a later time on a remote system. Being open source, rr provides a sandbox for early research,
but does not port well to deep embedded RTOS solutions. In [4] a checkpoint solution for
containers is proposed based on flagging of dirty pages and copying the data concurrently
with execution until a checkpoint barrier occurs fromwhich a checkpoint must be finalized.
The algorithm seeks to control the time spent during pre-copy versus stop-and-copy stages
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to reduce overall time spent on checkpointing. [22] creates a compile in software checkpoint-
ing that creates a shadow copy of memory during program execution.
2.1.2 Other RelatedWork
DMP[7] seeks to enforce deterministic sharedmemory inknownnon-deterministicmul-
tiprocessor environments. This canprovide anoptimizedmeans to create locations for check
pointing since it is another way to drive synchronization without traditional synchroniza-
tion barriers. The value is in the quantum definition of where to place the token passing.
Noticing that the hardware solutions provide speed upwhere the software solution provides
considerable slow down, it is not likely a viable software solution for real-time systems.
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Chapter 3
METHODOLOGY
3.1 Design
3.1.1 Dirty Page Tracking and Concurrent Checkpoint Process
The basis of the design utilizes the hardware mechanism of page faults to track memory
state changes. This provides support for multi-thread and multi-core environments. The
page faults occurs when physical memory is either not mapped to a virtual memory address
known as an anonymoॺ page, or does not have the correct permissions, such as writing to
a read-only page knwon as a dirty page. The soft dirty tracking defines the use of marking
writable pages as read-only, and where a write permissions fault occurs, the page is granted
write permission and marked as dirty by setting a bit in their respective page table entry. To
avoid parsing the entire page table to discover dirty pages, and dirty queue is implemented
which is populated at the same time the bit in the page table entry is set. Theprocess perform-
ing the checkpoint can then retrieve the dirty pages asynchronously from the dirty queue.
This tracking comes with an overhead which is discussed in the Chapter 4. Since the mem-
ory state changes must be synchronized to a known valid state for replay, all writes to mem-
ory after a checkpoint boundary must be prevented from modifying the physical memory
which may yet to be collected by the checkpointing process. Therefor the ckpt_inprogress
flag is used to signal the beginning of a checkpoint boundary. When a page fault occurs and
the flag is set, then the page fault will wait for an event signaling the checkpoint process is
complete. Once the ckpt_inprogress flag is set, the checkpointing facility should make sure
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all pages aremarked as read only such that anywrite tomemorymay be captured, and forced
to wait for the checkpoint finished signal event.
In order to properly checkpoint a multi-threaded application where multi-core schedul-
ing is possible, each thread must be checked in the kernel runqueue if it is scheduled and
running. If it is not running the cpu state can be saved from the scheduler task struct. If it is
running, then an smp_function_call is forced on the core where the thread is running, forc-
ing it to swap, and save the cpu state to the scheduler task struct. From the task_struct the
cpu register state can then be retrieved and saved for checkpoint replay. In the case of more
threads than cores, the runqueue can be modified to prevent other threads from running in
place before their cpu register state can be collected.
With all thread’s cpu register state collected, the dirty page queue must be emptied and
all physical memory changes remaining must be delivered to the checkpointing process in
user space. In the event of Virtual Memory Map changes, the entire VMA table is saved off
during each checkpoint and delivered to user space after the cpu register state is collected
but prior to the dirty queue being emptied the last time. Once all state changes are made
available to the checkpointing process in user space, the application selected for checkpoint
can continue. The Checkpointing process in userspace is responsible for saving of the final
checkpoint state to persistent storage. This flow with respect to dirty tracking is presented
in Figure 3.1.1
3.1.2 High level Design - Checkpoint
The checkpoint infrastructure consists of kernel modifications to existing page fault
flows and an accompanying kernel space driver called the creplay driver. The intelligence
for algorithm selection and orchestration occurs separately in a user space application, the
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Figure 1. Waveform Representation of Concurrent Checkpoint Activity with 2 Thread
1:The dirty queue fill by page faults for both anonymous pages and dirty pages.
2:The dirty queue is access asynchronously by the checkpointing process and pops one item
from the dirty queue at a time, copying the contents of the physical memory for that page
and marking it once more as read-only.
3:After some time, the checkpointing process will request a checkpoint and set the
ckpt_inprogress flag and immediately pop all remaining items from the dirty queue and
marking all pages as read-only.
4:Thread on CPU 3 has attempts to write to memory while ckpt_inprogress is set, a Page
Fault Stall Event occurs where the thread waits for the ckpt_finished_event.
5:The checkpointing process then requests the cpu register state of all threadswithin the pro-
cess. With Thread on CPU 2 still running, an smp_func_call is sent to that core to collect
the thread’s cpu register state.
6:ckpt_inprogress flag is unset creating a ckpt_finished_event allowing the application to
continue normally.
checkpointing process, where the checkpoint data is collected and saved to persistent storage.
The application selected for concurrent checkpoint has no knowledge of or interaction with
the underlying kernel hooks. Monitoring of the physical memory changes occurs through
the dirty page tracking. The kernel driver provides a facility that is flexible to multiple use
cases of such that the user can control the frequency of checkpointing and frequency of con-
current page copies. It is extendable to support a per page designation to reduce page faults
based on categorization such as type (ie. stack memory), or frequently written. Therefore
the checkpointing facility provided by the kernel driver can be reused by a different user
space application tuned to fit the needs of the target system.
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3.1.2.1 Workload Capabilities
There are no required changes to support concurrent checkpointing of an application.
Any application canbe launchedby the operating system, and interceptedby the checkpoint-
ing infrastructure. For applications where a known initialization phase occurs and threads
are spawned, a checkpoint syscall has been added that allows an application to stall and wait
until the checkpointing can begin. This sis call is defined as sys_checkpoint() with syscall
number 333. The PARSEC benchmarks used for testing have this syscall added at the begin-
ning of theRegion of Interest to properly intercept andmeasure the overhead of checkpoint-
ing.
3.1.3 Detailed Design
3.1.3.1 Concurrent Checkpoint Manager
Theuserspace application for controlling concurrent checkpointing is aC++application
that utilizes the Checkpoint and Replay Kernel Interface provided by /dev/creplay. The ap-
plication is run from the command line using the arguments from Table 1. Only the main
thread context is used and shared with all kernel level operations. At initialization time,
two RB-Trees are created to store the PTEs and VMAs representing the virtual and phys-
ical memory of the application to be checkpointed. PTrace is used to halt execution and stall
the threads initially to collect a baseline, but is not used in the concurrent checkpoint flow.
A pre-checkpoint is requested of the kernel1 as a baseline for all future checkpoints. If the
1Described by Section 3.1.3.3
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threads are stalled in the checkpoint syscall when the pre-checkpoint is requests, they will
begin executing after PTrace detaches.
Once all threads are running, the concurrent checkpointing begins by calling the
POP_QUEUE ioctl command from the kernel driver to collect pages in the dirty queue.
All data from the POP_QUEUE commands is persistent in memory until processed at the
end of the checkpoint. The POP_QUEUE repeats instantly if the dirty queue is not empty.
Once empty, a pause of 1/10thof the checkpoint periodoccurs and then thePOP_QUEUE is
repeated again followedby another pause. This continues until the end of the checkpoint pe-
riod is reached. To initiate the checkpoint, the POP_QUEUE command is called oncemore
with the ckpt_inprogress flag set. This represents the beginning of the checkpoint boundary.
The POP_QUEUE command repeats until the dirty queue is empty once more. All pages
within the target application should bemarked read-only at this point. If any pages in the ap-
plication have dirty tracking disabled for performance reasons, these pages should temporar-
ily be marked as read-only. The VMA data is then dumped next using the VMA_DUMP
ioctl command. The GET_REGS ioctl command is then called next to collect the CPU reg-
ister state of each thread to be checkpointed. Finally the POP_QUEUE command is called
once more with the ckpt_inprogress flag unset to signaling that the checkpoint is complete,
and the threads can continue. All the data must be processed at this point. The PTE data
from POP_QUEUE commands is queried against the data in the PTE RB-Tree using the
virtual address of each page. If the address does not exist in the tree, it is added and marked
as “new”. If it does exist, and any memory changes are found, it is marked as “dirty” with
the new contents copied into the existing data. Similarly with the VMA_DUMP data, the
VMA data is queried and flagged for changes. If the VMA region is new, it is added. If
it has shrunk, moved, or expanded, it is marks appropriately. All changes to the physical
pages are stored then written to a *.pte file, all vma changes are written to a *.vma file, and
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the CPU register states for each thread are written to a *.regs file. Finally the event log is
retrieved using the GET_LOG ioctl command and the checkpoint counter is incremented.
The concurrent checkpointing begins again by the repeated calls of POP_QUEUE until the
checkpoint period expires once more.
The copying of physical memory from the application is done by the kernel driver when
the POP_QUEUE command is issued. The checkpoint process is responsible for creating a
buffer adequate in size for the kernel to copy the memory contents into. The design choice
to use the kernel driver to perform the copy is an optimization from the way both CRIU
and PTrace supports. CRIU uses parasite called “Compel” to send the contents of memory
to the CRIU address space. Since the parasite takes over the threads, this intrusion was to
be avoided. PTrace also supports a means for one application to collect that memory state
of another by effectively mapping the target address into the consumers address space. This
was one possible solution but remained difficult in synchronizingwithmarking of each page
as read-only to correctly maintain the flow for correct dirty tracking. For this reason, the
copying of thememory contents is absolutely necessary when popping from the dirty queue
and using a separate facility such as PTrace versus performing the copy in the kernel driver,
did not seem like a natural design choice. When the memory contents are compared against
the data in the RB-Tree, any dirty pages would result in an additional copy in memory, and
then copiedoncemoreby the operationof saving the checkpoint state topersistentmemeory.
The overhead of these two final copies are not observed by the target process, therefor no
attempts to avoid them are made.
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Argument Description Default
-m <mode> Mode of operation. Options: pid, concur-
rent,concurrent_overhead concurrent_verify,
squash, squash_verify, replay_file
N/A
-o <filepath> Basefile name for output of checkpoint files. Cre-
ates “filepath”[.pte,.regs,.vma]
N/A
-c <filepath> Checkpoint file to use for replay N/A
-p <pid> PID of main process of focus for check-
point/replay
N/A
-s <size> Maximum size of page faults allowable per check-
point. Size up for larger checkpoints
4096
-b <begin> Checkpoint start number for squashing check-
points
0
-e <end> checkpoint end number for squashing check-
points
0
-f <freq> Target frequency for checkpoint operations 100
Table 1. Execution times of Blackscholes benchmark program
3.1.3.2 Kernel Modifications
AllKernelChanges arewrapped and enabledby theCONFIG_CREPLAYdefine at com-
pile time by the preprocessor. The KConfig additions are listed in Table 2 similarly with
a config file used during compilation located in the source tree as rt-creplay-config which
can be renamed to .config to reproduce the setup. The mm_struct structure is used as the
primary construct for storing checkpointing data. This includes the dirty queue defined
as struct pte_checkpoint_queue, the queue for the event log, a spinlock for checkpoint
synchronization, and multiple flags for managing state including the ckpt_inprogress and
ckpt_enabled flags. The vma_struct has the added unsigned char * pte_cpt_stage which
stores the state of each page within that vma context. The task_struct has a added flag for
logging when the thread is stalled in a page fault event.
The Soft-Dirty tracking used by CRIU is reused with slight modifications to track the
events and add the pages to the dirty queue. The page fault flow is first modified in the
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Config Name Description Default
CREPLAY Enable/Disable Support of CREPLAYDriver and asso-
ciated Kernel Hooks
Y
CREPLAY_QUEUE_INIT_SIZE The default queue size for saving off which dirty pages
must be copied.
1024
CREPLAY_NUM_INSTANCES Number of allowable concurrent checkpoint instances 8
Table 2. CREAPLY KConfig Settings
early flow within the handle_mm_fault() function. Here is where a forced stall occurs if
the thread’s ckpt_inprogress is set. If it is, it enters a wait_queue to be later woken up with
the checkpoint is complete. The do_anonymous_page() and handle_pte_fault() functions
are where the page tracking occurs and additions to the dirty queue are made. Within han-
dle_pte_fault() the pte_cpt_stage is updated to reflect the current state of the page in the
checkpointing process and logs if requeueing has occured2. The ckpt_event() logging func-
tion is added to assist in tracking all concurrent checkpointing events in the kernel and elim-
inate the need for printk style logging. Logging is also added to the context_switch() func-
tion to log context switch events3. The associative relationship for data structures within the
checkpoint facility is shown in Figure 3 with arrows representing pointers and dots repre-
senting instances. The checkpoint_file exists as a static array within the creplay kernel driver
supporting 8 instances by default.
3.1.3.3 Kernel Driver Interface
The kernel driver “creplay” houses the bulk of the changes including a syscall which
is why it is a compile-in driver rather than a module. The purpose of the creplay kernel
2The requeue counter is not used for any purpose at this time.
3the logging in the context_switch() function does not log all possible swap events as some events may be
missing from the final log
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driver is to avoid halting the threads to retrieve the application memory state and track ac-
tivity in a low cost manner. The IOCTL commands are listed in Table 3. The typical flow
will follow the state diagram in Figure 2. The first step in any concurrent checkpointing
scenario is the checkpoint syscall which will stall the threads until woken by the creplay
driver. A syscall in this case is used instead of ioctl to simplify integration with an appli-
cation of any permission level. The concurrent checkpoint infrastructure starts with issu-
ing a CHECKPOINT_MSG or CHECKPOINT_STALL_MSG. This saves of a baseline
of the application state, initializes the soft-dirty tracking, and wakes the threads(s) from the
checkpoint syscall. At this point the application is being activelymonitored, andDirty Pages
are available by the POP_QUEUE ioctl command. If POP_QUEUE is issues with (1) ar-
gument, representing ckpt_inprogress, then the application’s environment will transition
state and any future writes to memory should be prevented, but execution will not stop
otherwise. VMA_DUMP_MSG is should be used in this state to prevent added latency
once all threads are halted or stalled. TheGET_REGS ioctl changes the application environ-
ment state by forcing all thread to halt using an inter-processor interrupt (IPI) through the
smp_func_call mechanism. The application is then returned to the running state by issue-
ing POP_QUEUE with ckpt_inprogress cleared.
Concurrent checkpointing terminates with the thread, there is no mechanism to turn off
concurrent checkpointing at this time.
Concurrent checkpointing requires multiple asynchronous activity, including in areas
where preemption is not favorable. Spinlocks are in use in various flows but only for very
short moments, ideally less than 100 clocks worth of instructions. Both the Dirty Queue
and Event Log are wrapped by spinlocks to supportmulti-threaded applications. The check-
point also has a process wide spinlock for simplicity that is used to protect the pte_cpt_stage
of each vma_struct. This could be optimized similar to or directly reuse the kernel function
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pte_lockptr(). Mutex locks are use to protect the allocation into the checkpoint_file array.
The is only used during the checkpoint syscall, PID_MSG ioctl, andCHECKPOINT_MSG
ioctl flows.
Checkpoint initialization, ckpt_queue_init(), occurs during the checkpoint syscall,
of CHECKPOINT_MSG. This allocates the pointers for the pte_cpt_stage for all the
vma_sturcts currently present, and initializes the Event Log, Dirty Queue, and both Wait
Queues. The wait queues are used as a synchronization method between the creplay driver,
and the process being checkpointed. The ckpt_stall_event wait queue is used by the creplay
driver, to wait until the process enters a valid state for initial checkpoint. Once the check-
point syscall is made, a wake event is sent to the ckpt_stall_event. The ckpt_finished_event
wait queue is used by the threadswhen a page fault occurswhen ckpt_inprogress is set. Once
the checkpoint is complete for a thread and ckpt_inprogress is cleared, a wake event is sent
to ckpt_finished_event. The event log must persist after a process has terminated in order
to read all events. For this reason it is a statically allocated in the checkpoint file, rather than
dynamically at run time. A pointer is placed in the mm_struct of the process that it belongs
to at that time. The event log tracks the events listed in Table 4. The event are tracked using
the rdtscp[10] instruction to get the most accurate timing possible. Further serializing of
the instructions using cpuid is not favorable and dismissed to reduce the logging overhead.
3.2 Replay Design
The replay infrastructure uses the same components as the checkpoint flow but with ex-
tra functionality. In order to correctly replay using the concurrent checkpoint data files, the
process must have identical system level resources including PIDs, file pointers, etc. These
items are not critical to the concurrent checkpoint research and therefor leverages CRIU to
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IOCTL Command Description Data
PID_MSG Check if PID is active in the Checkpoint Ta-
bles and Cleans up non-existant threads
pid
MONITOR_MSG Enables Sift Dirty Tracking for a specific PID pid
WRITE_VMA_MSG Modifies the contents of a vma_struct, if it
does not exist, create it
pid and
vma_struct
details
WRITE_PTE_MSG Modifies the contents of a PTE. Must exist
within a vma_struct but can map new physi-
cal memory if it does not exist
pid, 4K page con-
tents, virtual and
physical address
POP_QUEUE Pops items off the Dirty Queue and returns
the physical
in:pid
memory contents and virtual remapped ker-
nel address. Sets ckpt_inprogress which de-
fines a Checkpoint Boundary
out:virtual, phys-
ical address, and
4K page contents
GET_REGS Collects the register State of the specific
PID(s). Issues an smp_func_call if PID(s) are
running
in: pid(s) out: x86
and x87 registers
VMA_DUMP_MSG Collects the Virtual memory map for a PID in:pid
out:vma_struct(s)
READ_PTE_MSG Reads the Physical memory of a PIDs address
space. Uses translated address if present
in:pid,address
out:4K data
GET_LOG Collects the event log of Checkpoint events event log entries
CHECKPOINT_MSG Dumps all physical and virtual memory con-
tents to a file and enables/clears Soft-Dirty
tracking bits.
pid
Note:Assumes the Targeted PID is halted but
is not required.
CHECKPOINT_STALL_MSG Waits for an application to enter a stalled
state from syscall. Then same as CHECK-
POINT_MSG
pid
Table 3. CREAPLY ioctl commands
checkpoint the system state prior to concurrent checkpoint, and similarly to restore the pro-
cess and system state. For a majority or real-time embedded applications, this is valid since
the initialization phase of applications will setup all system state, I/O, and memory prior to
regular execution.
The files from the concurrent checkpoint are not immediately consumable for check-
point since they describe changes between each checkpoint. To create a single restore point,
the collection of checkpoints are squashed together along with the pre-checkpoint applica-
tion state. These resulting files are then loaded into the Red-Black trees for VMA changes
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S0
No Ckpt
S1
Waiting 
for Ckpt
S2
Concurrent 
Checkpoint
Active
ckpt_inprogress=0
S3
Concurrent 
Checkpoint
Active
ckpt_inprogress=1
S4
Checkpoint 
Boundary Set
All Memory Marked 
Read-only
ckpt_inprogress=1
Checkpoint Syscall CHECKPOINT_STALL_MSG
POP_QUEUE
ckpt_inprogress=0
POP_QUEUE
ckpt_inprogress=0
POP_QUEUE
ckpt_inprogress=1
GET_REGS
POP_QUEUE
ckpt_inprogress=0
State Diagram representing on CREPLAY IOCTL Kernel Interface
S0: New process, Checkpoint Uninitialized
S1: Process Stalled for Checkpoint Initialization
S2: Process RunningWith concurrent Checkpoint
S3: Process Marked for Checkpoint Boundary
S4: All Threads Force Stalled for Checkpoint Boundary
Figure 2. State Diagram representing on CREPLAY IOCTL Kernel Interface
and PTE changes. The PID selected for replay is then halted along with all child TID using
ptrace attach. Each change noted in the red-black trees is written to their appropriate VMA
and PTE using the WRITE_VMA_MSG and WRITE_PTE_MSG commands to the cre-
play kernel driver. CPU state is written using ptrace SET_REGS and SET_FPREGS. Finally
the threads are restarted using ptrace detach.
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task_struct
vma_struct
mm_struct
checkpoint_event_queue
wait_queue : ckpt_stall_event
pid
Checkpoint Flags:
ckpt_enabled
ckpt_inprogress
ckpt_stall
wait_queue : ckpt_finished_event
spinlock : ckpt_lock
pte_cpt_stage
ckpt_page_fault_halt
checkpoint_file
pte_cpt_queue (Dirty Queue)
Figure 3. Relevant variables and their association to relevant kernel structures.
3.3 Additional Checkpoint, Monitoring, and Replay Techniques Not Addressed
In order to properly replay execution, certain events during execution must be repeated
that otherwise wouldn’t during replay from a static checkpoint. These areas are identified
with a purposed solution but not included in testing due to limited scope.
3.3.1 Copy onWrite
Copy on Write (COW) is theorize to further reduce the overhead of a checkpoint by
preventing the application for waiting for the ckpt_finished_event when a page fault occurs
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when ckpt_inprogress is set. The idea is to copy the memory contents of that page to a sepa-
rate buffer that can be retrieved much like the dirty queue and allow the thread to continue
running. This was not extensively tested as there is complexity in managing the memory
state, and correctly collecting the cpu register state since the thread is known to be crossing
the checkpoint boundary. A few of the requirements have been implemented such as the
data_checkpoint_queue but a separate retrievalmethod is necessary that alsomarks the page
as read-only after the ckpt_inprogress flag is unset and the contents are read in the following
checkpoint period.
3.3.2 Syscall Monitoring
Syscalls can be trapped by ptrace that allows for both monitoring and manipulation.
This is one simple solution to have the concurrent checkpoint thread trap on syscalls from
the real-time application. The issue is the overhead of trapping syscalls which requires ex-
tra scheduling delays and can cause serialization of syscalls where they otherwise wouldn’t
be. One possible solution to avoid this is to manipulate the syscalls in the kernel to support
concurrent monitoring, and replay when the data is available. With hundreds of syscalls, all
scattered through out the kernel, this is a larger effort than what can be achieved as part of
this work.
3.3.3 Syscall Replay
Replaying syscall behavior is possible using ptrace just as it is for monitoring. All syscall
data can be stored to a file, and used for replay. Where replay is not required to run at real-
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time speeds, added overhead is not a concern. For replay, manipulation of the kernel is less
likely, although knowledge of each syscall would be necessary for correct operation.
3.3.4 RDTSCMonitoring
RDTSC andRDTSCPprovide immediate access to the cpu clockwithout costly syscalls.
Since it is natively supported by the Instruction Set Architecture and allowed in User Space
there is no simple trapping on execution of the instruction. It is possible to trap with a hy-
pervisor, which is common in real-time embedded systems, this adds additional complexity
to the test setup that is out of scope. An ideal solution would trap on execution of the in-
struction, and save off the value to a space where the concurrent checkpoint can retrieve it at
time of checkpoint without overhead to the application. A hypervisor such as JailHouse[18]
or ACRN[9] is used in these environments and can be modified for this support.
3.3.5 RDTSC Replay
Replaying of RDTSC values is more difficult since the instruction still requires trapping
through hypervisor. In this case for each execution window, a data buffer of RDTSC values
would be passed to the hypervisor, fromwhich all trapped calls could be linked and repeated.
Instruction replacement is not possible since RDTSC has too small of a byte count.
3.3.6 MMIOMonitoring
Device or SensorData is typically received through aMemory Buffer commonly referred
to as an RX buffer. These either exist in device memory where memory read instructions
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translate device I/O or the buffer exists in system memory and is asynchronously updated
throughDMA transactions originating from the device or sensor itself. DMATransactions
are a system level operation with little to no visibility to theOperating system orHypervisor
making this not simply trappable. The memory read accesses are possibly known, atleast
to a developer, and possibly to the Operating system, based on how mmap is used if at all
within the user space application. If a kernel driver is used, then the ioctl or similar syscall
can be addressed as before. Since addresses typically result is a page fault is a trap is desired,
the ovrhead can be great. One possible solution is instruction injection by modifying the
applications code itself to inject write after read of the data, if those instructions are known
to access MMIO regions. This is not an ideal solution since it requires both memory and
cache bandwidth and can double the instruction density for functions that require monitor-
ing. A hardware solution such as Intel’s Processor Trace could be be used to collect MMIO
transactions but the overhead is not bounded and is not fit for real-time applications.
3.3.7 MMIOReplay
Replay ofMMIO instructions is a complex topic since they are boundedbyphysical time
based onwhen the data was last written by an asynchronous entity such as a device or sensor.
In replay, physical time is not known and is bounded by logical time such as Lamport clocks
or more complex vector clocks. This makes maintaining the memory buffers difficult and
instead requires each memory read instruction to be replayed exactly. One solution similar
as described for monitoring is instruction injection. In the case of replay, the data is read
from a file or buffer in memory, rather than the desired address. This requires basic address
checking to make sure the replaying thread has not shifted to a new execution path.
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3.4 Measurements
The software for observation used is the PARSEC 3.0 benchmark suite with modifica-
tions to identify cycle specific performance and checkpoint latency. These two categories
address the overhead of concurrent checkpointing in relation to the response time for each
given workload. Additional measurements in the kernel flows are added to better character-
ize areas of latency such as the soft dirty tracking latency and per thread forced stalls. Non-
critical measurements exist in areas that do not directly impact the overhead observed by the
workload but can indirectly impact the limits of checkpointing given the total system level
performance.
3.4.1 PARSECModifications
The PARSEC Benchmarks are organized to separate the initialization from the critical
section resulting in aRegion of Interest orROIwheremeasurement should take place. Upon
entering the ROI, a synchronization is made with CRIU using SIGSTOP and SIGCONT
after which synchronization is made with the concurrent checkpoint to begin using a newly
added syscall. After these synchronization points, the workload should continue executing
be in a controlled environment where all threads are created, file pointers are in place. Mem-
ory changes are allowable after initialization through allocation to heap or the increase in
stack size from sbrk().
Each workload is broken into cycles that already exist but for sake of measurement are
isolated by a new syscall to allow for both event logging and synchronization with the con-
current checkpointing. Synchronization is optional, and only crucial when operatingwithin
the bounds of an isochronous scheduling method for responses and checkpoints.
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Each benchmark is not created with real-time performance in mind, making each cycle’s
performance unrelated to all other cycles. Therefor when analyzing performance, the data
is represented as a transient. Further analysis of each transient is discussed in the Analysis
section.
3.4.2 Important Events and definitions
A list of all events logged by the checkpoint infrastructure is presented in Table 4. These
are used to capture the associated activity and support the calculations required to identify
various sources of overhead. All events are captured with a time using the RDTSCP instruc-
tion.
3.4.2.1 Checkpoint Boundary
The setting of ckpt_inprogress defines a checkpoint boundary from which all future
memory writes should be pushed to the following checkpoint period. The state of the appli-
cation is not synchronized with the ckpt_inprogress flag directly, but rather all future page
faults that occur when the flag is set. If pages exist that are writable, the writes to this mem-
ory space will be accounted for in the current checkpoint period until the pages are marked
read-only and the resulting page fault on a future write will push the writes to the following
checkpoint period.
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Event Name Function Location Important Data
PAGE_FAULT_ANON do_anonymous_page() cpu, pid, virtual address
PAGE_FAULT_DIRTY handle_pte_fault() cpu, pid, virtual address
PAGE_FAULT_FINISH handle_pte_fault() cpu, pid, virtual address
PAGE_FAULT_STALL handle_mm_fault() cpu, pid, virtual address
PAGE_FAULT_RESUME handle_mm_fault() cpu, pid, virtual address
SWAP_IN context_switch() cpu, current pid, parent pid,
next pid
SWAP_OUT context_switch() cpu, prev pid, parent pid, new
pid
SMP_FUNC_CALL_ISSUE creplay:device_ioctl() cpu, pid
SMP_FUNC_CALL_COMPLETE creplay:device_ioctl() cpu, pid
POP_PAGE creplay:device_ioctl() virtual address
PAGE_WALK_START creplay:device_ioctl() virtual address
PAGE_WALK_COMPLETE creplay:device_ioctl() virtual address
MEMREMAP_START creplay:device_ioctl() physical address
MEMREMAP_COMPLETE creplay:device_ioctl() physical address, remapped ad-
dress
PAGE_COPY_START creplay:device_ioctl() physical address, remapped ad-
dress
PAGE_COPY_COMPLETE creplay:device_ioctl() physical address, remapped ad-
dress
CLEAR_DIRTY creplay:device_ioctl() virtual address
CHECKPOINT_START creplay:device_ioctl()
CHECKPOINT_COMPLETE creplay:device_ioctl()
THREAD_HALTED creplay:device_ioctl() pid
TRHEAD_UNQUEUED creplay:device_ioctl() pid
Table 4. Logging Events
3.4.2.2 Checkpoint Period
The checkpoint period is the window of time between when the cpu register states are
collected against a synchronized memory state of the entire process. A checkpoint period
represents all state changes that have occurred compared to the previos checkpoint period.
3.4.2.3 Checkpoint Finished
The checkpoint finished event is generated by the kernel driver when a POP_QUEUE
command is issued with the ckpt_inprogress flag unset. The event will occur at the end of
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the POP_QUEUE flow as to catch copy any pages that cause a Page Fault and waiting for
the ckpt_finished_event.
3.4.2.4 Fast Page Fault
This event occurs when a a write operation targets a physical memory page that is clean
andmarked as read-only. This is the quickest type of page fault which the kernel can quickly
update the PTE in the TLB and resume execution. The start of the event is the result of a
hardware initiate fault event that is not directly measurable using simple methods. The Fast
Page Fault is a product of the dirty page tracking used for concurrent checkpointing and
would not occur otherwise.
3.4.2.5 Anonymous Page Fault
Anonymous page faults are a product of writes to virtualmemory that is known to a pro-
cess but does not yet have physical memory associated with it. These faults occur naturally
in all operating environments. The dirty page tracking treats these page faults similarly to
the fast page fault if the memory type is writable. A read-only page in this case is assumed
to be generated by another means that the OS should handle during replay. Like fast page
faults, the overhead from anonymous page faults is not easily measured.
3.4.2.6 Page Table Entry Clear (PTE Clear)
Each time a page is saved off for concurrent checkpointing outside of a full process stall,
the PTE and TLB entries must be updated to clean and marked as read-only. This requires
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locking either the entire page table or a segment of it, possibly stalling other page faults. Since
the PTE Clear typically occurs by the checkpointing thread it can add undesired latency to
the workload by serialization as a result of these shared locks. The time to perform a PTE
Clear by itself does not directly impact the target process.
3.4.2.7 Forced Thread Stall
A forced thread stall occurs when all threads in a process must delay future execution
of writes to physical memory. This occurs through either a page fault triggered by the dirty
page tracking, syscall synchronization, or smp_func_call methods. Each method of stall is
measurable based on the initial event such as the occurrence of the page fault, syscall, or
smp_func_call. The stall is observed to finish when a the thread is observed to have been
swapped in by a context switch.
3.4.3 Calculations
3.4.3.1 Runtime - truntime
The runtime of the of theworkload is themeasured time to complete theRegion of Inter-
est part of the PARSECbenchmark. This is reported out to the console once the benchmark
completes.
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3.4.3.2 Overhead - toverhead
The overhead is the difference in runtime between when concurrent checkpointing is
activated using the compilation config gcc-ckpt_replay and when it is not using gcc-hooks.
3.4.3.3 Page Fault Stall Overhead tpfstall
Each page fault stall event can be measured per core by a page fault that occurs when
ckpt_inprogress is set. This is measured as the time between PAGE_FAULT_STALL and
PAGE_FAULT_RESUME. A summation of all tpfstall will provide a total overhead from
page fault stalls represented as Tpfstall. In the case of multicore systems, this total overhead
is shared between all cores. For measurement, the maximum of total observed overhead per
each core, is stated as the Tpfstall.
3.4.3.4 Dirty Tracking Overhead - Ttracking
With concurrent checkpointing activated the overhead observed from tracking alone
is assumed to be toverhead - Tpfstall. The per page fault overhead ttracking is generalized as
Ttracking/npfdirty, with npfdirty as the number of page faults per core.
3.4.4 Non-Critical Measurements
Additional events while measurable, are not as critical to determining the overhead con-
current checkpointing, but rather can be used to determine the limits of the infrastructure
and various areas of optimization.
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3.4.4.1 Page Copy Performance - tpage_copy
The copying a page of memory from a kernel remapped address to a user space buffer
using copy_to_user().
3.4.4.2 Page Walk Performance - tpage_walk
While the PTE value is commonly knownduring a page fault, a full pagewalk is required
to collect the various structures in the entire page table to properly lock the page table region
from changes and update the dirty tracking. This typically is a long latency serialized opera-
tion with little to no cache benefit.
3.4.4.3 Page Remap Performance - tpage_remap
The x86 architecture when running in protected mode, the kernel must map physical
memory from a user space process into its virtual address space to support access. This is
performed by the memremap() using a MEMREMAP_WB flag to generate a write-back
configuration.
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Chapter 4
RESULTS
4.1 System Setup
The system setup uses a MinnowBoard Turbot Quad-Core board running Ubuntu
18.04 LTS with a modified 4.11.12-rt16+ kernel build booting off a SanDisk 120GB SSD. The
kernel config is reduced and scrubbed for compile-in drivers only without any usage of an
initramfs. While the system is not heavily tuned formore stringent real-time usage, the “isol-
cpus=1,2,3” kernel argument is used at boot time to isolate the last two cores from regular
system scheduling and interrupts. The PARSEC benchmarks used for measurement and
compiledusing gcc-hooks and gcc-ckpt_replay. “gcc-ckpt_replay” in this case refers to amod-
ified gcc-hooks configuration with a synchronization for CRIU and syscall that is needed
during the initialization of the concurrent checkpoint operation. The PARSEC[1] bench-
marks used are blackscholes and canneal. The concurrent checkpointing is run using the
configurations for data collection listed in Table 5. These vary the frequency of the check-
point placement, and PARSEC simulation and native input datasets. The frequency of the
POP_QUEUE calls is set to 1/10th of the checkpoint period.
The concurrent checkpoint is first started with CRIU and restored for a clean operating
Frequency Checkpoint Arguments Target Datasets
50Hz ./rt_ckpt <..> -s 4096 -f 50 native
25Hz ./rt_ckpt <..> -s 4096 -f 25 native
10Hz ./rt_ckpt <..> -s 4096 -f 10 native
1Hz ./rt_ckpt <..> -s 4096 -f 1 native
Table 5. Caption
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environment after which the application will run with concurrent checkpoint active. The
output of event logging is redirected to a file.
criu dump -t <pid> --shell-job --images-dir criu_images
criu restore --shell-job --images-dir criu_images
./rt_ckpt -m concurrent -o ckpt -p <pid> -s 4096 > concurrent_log.txt
Sample output of blackscholes with checkpoint enabled is listed as follows:
PARSEC Benchmark Suite Version 3.0-beta-20150206
[HOOKS] PARSEC Hooks Version 1.2
Num of Options: 65536
Num of Runs: 100
Size of data: 2621440
[HOOKS]SIGSTOP Waiting for CRIU
[1]+ Stopped taskset -c 2,3 ...
fg
taskset -c 2,3 ./pkgs/apps/blackscholes/inst/amd64-linux.gcc-ckpt_replay/bin/blackscholes 1 ...
[HOOKS]SYSCALL_CKPT Waiting for Concurrent Checkpoint
[HOOKS] Entering ROI
[HOOKS] Leaving ROI
[HOOKS] Total time spent in ROI: 2.647s
[HOOKS] Terminating
4.2 Activity Description
The activity of concurrent checkpointing is represented in Figure 4. 3 Areas are selected
for viewing. A-B and E-F show the checkpointing process, with the “Checkpoint” signal
representing ckpt_inprogress. From these the ckpt_inporogress is set using POP_QUEUE
where the dirty tracking queue is emptied and with page walks, page remapping, and page
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copying occurring. While the dirty tracking queue is being emptied, a page fault occurs in all
three threads causing the page fault stall event. These threads remain in the page fault stall
until the ckpt_finished_event is observed by those threads after the ckpt_inprogress signal
is unset. For consistency, all pages marked as dirty have a low cost bulk copy that occurs at
the end of the checkpoint prior to unsetting ckpt_inprogress. This is to catch any inconsis-
tencies in the timing and sequencing of dirty tracking. In a production enviroment, this can
be removed with adequate verification of the dirty tracking sequencing. The performance
penalty of the extra copies was tested for and left in for consistency. The actual impact was
minimal on the order of less than 10%ofTpfstall. Small swap events can be seenwhen the Page
Fault stall event occurs but since no other threads are assigned to those cores, the threads re-
main active, but dormant until the ckpt_finished_event is observed.
The activity between markers C and D in Figure 4 show the concurrent checkpointing
activity. Page faults occur on each core in thier respective threads filling up the dirty queue.
A POP_QUEUE command is sent with ckpt_inprogress unset to collect the dirty page thus
far but not yet prepare for a checkpoint. The page walks, remaps, and copies during this
phase have little to no impact on the target process. Serialization of page faults, and some
delays can be observed due to the use of locks in the page table structure, and the dirty queue.
Global locks are avoided to prevent latency propagation from the checkpointing facility to
the target thread.
The required use of smp_func_call is demonstrated in Figure 5 when the GET_REGS
command occurs prior to the threads being halted through either a page fault stall or sched-
uler swap. Since a full context_switch is not observed, the swap events do not show in the
wave form, but this is the point the cpu state registers are captured. A page fault stall event
is still observed to prevent writes from entering the previous checkpoint period but this has
no impact on the cpu state registers used for the checkpoint. The final page walk and remap
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is to have a second check of the address faults that occur after the GET_REGS command,
but the contents to be written to memory are not allowed until the page fault resumes after
ckpt_inprogress is unset.
4.3 Blackscholes Data
The runtime data comparing checkpoint frequency to standalone application without
checkpointing is presenting in Table 6. The overhead observed by looking at the run-time is
quite small with themost observed as 1.059 slowdownwith a checkpoint target frequency of
50Hz in the 2 thread configuration. The checkpoint frequency of 50Hz is not sustainable by
looking at the activity waveform in Figure 6 and comparing it against the equivalent 25Hz
configuration. This shows that the SucceedingPOP_QUEUEcommand is delayedby about
60% of the checkpoint period since the user space checkpoint application is busy saving the
state changes form the prior checkpoint. Additional measurements can be made with the
user space checkpoint application to find it’s limits and possible optimization’s to support
higer frequencies, but this work is focused on the target application overhead from concur-
rent checkpointing. A breakdown of the measurable overhead and assumed dirty tracking
overhead is presented in Table 7. The dirty tracking overhead is not easily measured since it
requires visibility of hardware events such as interrupts and micro-architectural latency. For
analysis, this overhead will be represented as the remaining overhead after subtracting the
total delay observed from page fault stalls. Further study of the checkpoint overhead can be
used to define a overhead per page fault for the tracking and a forced stall overhead. The
per page fault overhead uses the assumed dirty tracking overhead divided by the number of
page faults resulting in a rough overhead in microseconds. For Blackscholes, these items are
calculated from the data in Table 8.
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Figure 4. 3 Thread Concurrent Checkpoint Activity
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Figure 5. 3 Thread Concurrent Checkpoint Activity - Cont.
Execution times (seconds) Slowdown factors
Dataset no
chkp
1Hz 10Hz 25Hz 50Hz 1Hz 10Hz 25Hz 50Hz
1 Thread 329.7 335.125 339.826 341.557 340.401 1.016 1.031 1.037 1.032
2 Thread 164.592 167.355 170.357 170.388 174.365 1.017 1.035 1.035 1.059
3 Thread 109.928 111.811 114.388 115.923 113.038 1.017 1.041 1.055 1.028
Table 6. Execution times of Blackscholes benchmark program
Execution overhead in ms
Results Total overhead Page Fault
Stalls (%)
Assumed Dirty
Tracking (%)
Per
Checkpoint
Overhead(ms)
1 Thread 1Hz 5.425 2.709(49.9%) 2.715(50.0%) 8.797
1 Thread 10Hz 10.126 5.916(58.4%) 4.208(41.6%) 1.938
1 Thread 25Hz 12.252 8.481(69.2%) 3.751(30.6%) 1.149
1 Thread 50Hz 10.701 6.386(59.7%) 4.254(39.8%) 0.445
2 Thread 1Hz 2.763 1.490(53.9%) 1.273(46.1%) 9.430
2 Thread 10Hz 5.765 3.598(62.4%) 2.165(37.6%) 2.239
2 Thread 25Hz 5.796 2.625(45.3%) 3.155(54.4%) 0.658
2 Thread 50Hz 9.773 5.872(60.1%) 3.862(39.5%) 0.770
3 Thread 1Hz 1.883 0.739(39.2%) 1.144(60.7%) 6.657
3 Thread 10Hz 4.460 2.867(64.3%) 1.592(35.7%) 2.533
3 Thread 25Hz 5.995 4.291(71.6%) 1.693(28.2%) 1.556
3 Thread 50Hz 3.110 1.340(43.1%) 1.741(56.0%) 0.255
Table 7. Blackscholes Overhead
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Execution overhead in ms
Results npfdirty ncheckpoint
(Actual
Frequency)
npfdirty
sec
npfdirty
ncheckpoint
tpfdirty(us)
1 Thread 1Hz 843433 308(0.9) 2516.771 2738.419 3.219
1 Thread 10Hz 981168 3052(9.0) 2887.266 321.484 4.289
1 Thread 25Hz 1016093 7383(21.6) 2971.449 137.626 3.691
1 Thread 50Hz 984006 14343(42.1) 2890.726 68.605 4.323
2 Thread 1Hz 410896 158(0.9) 2455.236 2600.608 3.688
2 Thread 10Hz 491228 1607(9.4) 2883.521 305.680 4.592
2 Thread 25Hz 498993 3987(23.4) 2928.569 125.155 6.761
2 Thread 50Hz 403250 7622(43.7) 2312.677 52.906 10.213
3 Thread 1Hz 204176 111(1.0) 1826.082 1839.423 6.176
3 Thread 10Hz 325558 1132(9.9) 2846.085 287.595 5.558
3 Thread 25Hz 243136 2757(23.8) 2097.392 88.189 7.198
3 Thread 50Hz 197945 5263(46.6) 1751.137 37.611 9.314
Table 8. Blackscholes Overhead Analysis
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Figure 6. Blackscholes: Comparing 2 Thread Checkpoint Period 25Hz to 50Hz
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Execution times (seconds) Slowdown factors
Dataset no
chkp
1Hz 10Hz 25Hz 50Hz 1Hz 10Hz 25Hz 50Hz
1 Thread 354.742 361.801 386.79 397.094 390.152 1.020 1.090 1.119 1.100
2 Thread 184.859 190.196 193.339 197.084 204.042 1.029 1.046 1.066 1.104
3 Thread 127.815 132.57 135.818 139.036 151.94 1.037 1.063 1.088 1.189
Table 9. Execution times of Canneal benchmark program
4.4 Canneal Data
Canneal has larger memory footprint than blackscholes with irregular memory access.
The checkpoint overhead is more apparent than blackscholes, specifically seeing that the
number of page faults is 4x greater for canneal in 1 thread configurations at 10hz than the
similar configuration for blackscholes. The slow down is greater for this reason as well the
overhead observed from dirty tracking, vs overhead from page fault stalls. 9. Serialization is
also more apparent from page faults in the 2 and 3 thread configurations. Canneal requires
more time to save larger amounts of state changes due to the greater number of page faults.
Since the tpfdirty does notmatch blackscholes closely, the concurrent checkpointingwas tested
with only POP_QUEUE commands being issues and never setting ckpt_inprogress. This
data is representing in Tables 12 and 13. The overhead is isolated per core to see possible vari-
ation between threads on each core. Looking at the waveform activity in Figure 7, the extra
pagefaults that occur on Core 1 are skewing the overhead results, making Core 2 and 3 num-
bers appearing to have a larger overhead. for this reason all data captured focuses on Core 1
results only ignoring data for Core 2 and 3 in the case of multicore runs.
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Execution overhead in ms
Results Total overhead Page Fault
Stalls (%)
Assumed Dirty
Tracking (%)
Per
Checkpoint
Overhead(ms)
1 Thread 1Hz 7.059 1.760(24.9%) 5.299(75.1%) 5.569
1 Thread 10Hz 32.048 13.804(43.1%) 18.244(56.9%) 4.086
1 Thread 25Hz 42.352 21.543(50.9%) 20.806(49.1%) 2.549
1 Thread 50Hz 35.410 20.077(56.7%) 15.248(43.1%) 1.255
2 Thread 1Hz 5.337 2.075(38.9%) 3.262(61.1%) 11.465
2 Thread 10Hz 8.480 2.985(35.2%) 5.487(64.7%) 1.712
2 Thread 25Hz 12.225 3.916(32.0%) ) 8.282(67.7%) 0.866
2 Thread 50Hz 19.183 8.269(43.1%) 10.854(56.6%) 0.899
3 Thread 1Hz 4.755 1.144(24.1%) 3.611(75.9%) 9.081
3 Thread 10Hz 8.003 2.464(30.8%) 5.535(69.2%) 1.954
3 Thread 25Hz 11.221 4.184(37.3%) 7.019(62.5%) 1.289
3 Thread 50Hz 23.379 14.197(60.7%) 9.141(39.1%) 2.248
Table 10. Canneal Overhead
Execution overhead in ms
Results npfdirty ncheckpoint
(Actual
Frequency)
npfdirty
sec
npfdirty
ncheckpoint
tpfdirty(us)
1 Thread 1Hz 1059333 316(0.9) 2927.944 3352.320 5.002
1 Thread 10Hz 4067596 3378(8.7) 10516.290 1204.143 4.485
1 Thread 25Hz 4094040 8452(21.3) 10310.002 484.387 5.082
1 Thread 50Hz 1922762 15993(41.0) 4928.238 120.225 7.930
2 Thread 1Hz 564792 181(1.0) 2969.526 3120.398 5.808
2 Thread 10Hz 722335 1743(9.0) 3736.106 414.421 7.826
2 Thread 25Hz 736951 4523(22.9) 3739.274 162.934 11.471
2 Thread 50Hz 723334 9199(45.1) 3545.025 78.632 15.648
3 Thread 1Hz 408758 126(1.0) 3083.337 3244.111 8.984
3 Thread 10Hz 511564 1261(9.3) 3766.541 405.681 11.060
3 Thread 25Hz 544793 3247(23.4) 3918.359 167.783 13.258
3 Thread 50Hz 536797 6315(41.8) 3550.386 85.003 17.841
Table 11. Canneal Overhead Analysis
Execution times (seconds)
Dataset no chkp 1Hz 10Hz 25Hz 50Hz
3 Thread 127.815 130.383 131.572 133.204 133.201
Table 12. Execution times of Canneal with dirty tracking only
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Execution overhead in ms
Results npfdirty
npfdirty
sec
tpfdirty(us)
3 Thread 1Hz Core 1 391461 3002.393 6.560
3 Thread 10Hz Core 1 563240 4280.850 6.670
3 Thread 25Hz Core 1 654184 4911.144 8.238
3 Thread 50Hz Core 1 573570 4306.049 9.390
3 Thread 1Hz Core 2 210927 1617.749 12.175
3 Thread 10Hz Core 2 350625 2664.891 10.715
3 Thread 25Hz Core 2 432056 3243.566 12.473
3 Thread 50Hz Core 2 343797 2581.039 15.666
3 Thread 1Hz Core 3 208725 1600.861 12.303
3 Thread 10Hz Core 3 351888 2674.490 10.677
3 Thread 25Hz Core 3 431464 3239.122 12.490
3 Thread 50Hz Core 3 342478 2571.137 15.727
Table 13. Canneal Overhead Analysis
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Figure 7. Canneal: 3 Thread 10 Hz Dirty Tracking Only
Since all the threads join prior to the end of checkpointing, the data for Core 1 has more
pagefaults causing the overhead to be skewed
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4.5 Analysis
For the two workloads with varying configurations there is a trend between checkpoint
frequency and overhead observed. The goal of this research is to de-emphisize the dominant
delay from the checkpoint itself and shift it into a concurrent operation where only limited
amount of the overhead is observed by the target application. This has been successful in
showing that less that 75% of the total overhead is a directly related to stopping the process
while the application state is captured. In most cases, there is a even distribution of forced
stalls, and general overhead with a few observances of tracking being a major overhead. In
blackscholes, most checkpoint delays are observed to be less than 5ms when running in mul-
ticore operation and in single coremode,most checkpoints were 500us or less. This validates
the solution as a candidate for soft real-time systems that can absorb a average 10% overhead
to the required response time. When first developing the checkpoint, all page copies within
the checkpoint flow would perform a full page walk, remap, and finalize with unmap forc-
ing the operation to repeat completely. This greatly increased the checkpoint time since each
page walk took on average 1us and the remapping from physical to virtual address in the ker-
nel took on average 3.5us. The page copying itself can be lengthy when cache misses occur,
but averages out to less than 1us. The page walk and remapping steps can be eliminated if
caching the result and leaving the remapping in place for future events. This results in a
rather difficult cleanup from anOS perspective once checkpointing is finished and the appli-
cation either continues normally, or exits. The data from the tables are compiled into graphs
in Figure 8 and Figure 9 to assist in visualizing trends between checkpoint frequency and
overhead measurements. Figure 9(a) highlights an average overhead for each page fault due
to dirty tracking. Figure 9(b) shows the comparison of tracking overheadwith andwithout a
checkpoint occurring. Figure 9(c) represents the number of page faults due to tracking. The
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checkpoint frequency in this setup has less impact onnumber of page faults it produces since
as the frequency increases less POP_QUEUE commands are possible within the checkpoint
period. Figures 10 show a histogram of the amount of repeated unique addresses during a
checkpoint period due to the POP_QUEUE command. For both workloads running in a 3
thread configuration, the amount of repeated addresses increase exponentially as the check-
point frequency reduces. This is why in Figure 8(b) an unusually large overhead is observed
for canneal running 1 thread. When a checkpoint period is larger such as 1s or more, it is ben-
eficial to cluster the POP_QUEUE commands near the end of the checkpoint period, rather
than spread themout evenly as doneby these tests. Theworkloadsusedparallelizewell across
all cores, allowing the page faults to also be spread evenly across all cores. For workloads that
are parallelized based on producer and consumer, the producer threads will observe the bulk
of the tracking overhead and consumer thread will be generally left unaffected. As a work-
load becomes more parallel across multiple cores, it is possible for page faults to serialize due
to the semaphore for the mm_struct, mmap_sem. This is required to be held for most page
faults, and similarly is required in the POP_QUEUE command flow. This fits well with
page fault overhead doubling when parallelism is used. Reducing the dependency on the
mmap_sem may reduce this latency, but it may not be possible with the current page fault
architecture. For comparison with CRIU, six checkpoints are measured for both Canneal
and Blackscholes when running in the 3 Thread gcc-hooks configuration presented in Ta-
ble 14. Checkpoints performed by CRIU, copy the entire memory space which is why the
checkpoint time is very large. Criu’s page copy routines are quite inefficient in comparison.
In [4], using CRIU’s pre-dump can further improve the checkpoint times into the 100s of
milliseconds range, but the work presented here presents a checkpoint method 2 orders of
magnitude faster than [4].
46
Total
Checkpoint
Time(s)
Page Copy
Time(s)
Core State
Copy
Time(ms)
Memory Copy
Size(MB)
Average 4K
Page Copy
Time(us)
Blackscholes 3 Thread
5.77s 5.71s 0.36ms 610.00MB 36.6us
6.28s 6.24s 0.34ms 610.00MB 39.9us
5.43s 5.35s 0.46ms 610.00MB 34.3us
5.46s 5.43s 0.47ms 610.00MB 34.8us
6.42s 6.39s 0.37ms 610.00MB 40.9us
5.73s 5.69s 0.52ms 610.00MB 36.4us
Canneal 3 Thread
14.32s 14.28s 1.43ms 847.00MB 65.8us
19.29s 19.25s 0.47ms 847.00MB 88.8us
21.84s 21.82s 0.44ms 847.00MB 100.6us
19.04s 18.99s 0.38ms 847.00MB 87.5us
25.51s 25.46s 0.45ms 847.00MB 117.4us
31.49s 31.46s 0.47ms 847.00MB 145.0us
Table 14. CRIU Checkpoint Comparison Data
4.5.1 Concurrent Checkpoint Applied Analysis
The purpose of concurrent checkpoint with respect to Real-Time Embedded Systems
is to create a reliable checkpoint frame work with minimal impact to the performance of a
target Real-Time application. Such systems have a desired response time within a defined
Quality of Service. The checkpoint facility can be orchestrated differently based on the al-
lowable overhead and any possible discoveries during its operation. The simplest solution
is to alter the frequency and placement of the POP_QUEUE requests to reduce the dirty
tracking overhead if the same addresses are known to be found multiple times. This can
be reduced by delaying the POP_QUEUE longer after a ckpt_inprogress is unset from the
previous checkpoint period. As noticed when attempting to checkpoint the benchmarks at
50Hz, the POP_QUEUE commands are not equally placed and are usually delayed by the
amount of time to save the previous checkpoint to disk. This shows that while the check-
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Figure 8. Checkpoint Latency Analysis Graphs
pointing frequency increases, the amount of page faults for dirty tracking do not increase.
The tracking overhead similarly does not increase at the same rate as the checkpointing fre-
quency either. Additional hooks canbe added to reducedirty trackingoverhead for common
duplicates such as stack memory. A stage is attached to each vma_struct to provide this per
page classification. A requeue counter is present used to count the amount of repeats of a
specific page. Neither the stage or counter is not used in the current implementation. This
provides extensible in both the kernel modifications, or the user space interface to manipu-
late the behavior as needed.
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSION
The method presented in this work is a low cost solution to perform concurrent check-
pointing by using a dirty page tracking scheme for soft real-time embedded environments.
The method performs best when memory is heavily reused during the applications life to
further reduce the per page fault cost. If incorporated into CRIU to fully utilize all its ca-
pabilities along side concurrent checkpointing, a robust checkpoint and replay can be pro-
duced and dramatically reduce the checkpoint delay spent in copying application memory
state. Concurrent checkpointing can quickly exhaust a storage medium as well depending
on the frequency of checkpoints and amount of dirty pages per checkpoint. By employing
various algorithms to deciding which pages to copy concurrently or during a checkpoint
can help in reducing the dirty tracking overhead. The highest cost of a checkpoint comes
from remapping the physical memory from one process into the kernel before copying into
a storage medium. The actual copy of the memory is quite low cost compared to other la-
tency’s by an order of magnitude. One such comparison is to not copy memory and leave it
marked as dirty, but perform all the remapping during each checkpoint period. This makes
the checkpoint more difficult to schedule since a page fault stall is what helps halt all threads
during a checkpoint and it is difficult to achieve checkpoint synchronization if writes are
not restricted around the checkpoint boundary. Additional optimization could be made to
reduce dirty tracking costs for stack memory, but would require understanding where the
stack pointer is, especially in cases where an applications stack grows very large with more
data items in stack than heap.
The ideal usage for this method of concurrent checkpointing exists at 10Hz or below
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due to some of the long latency’s observed in the microseconds. When stepping into 100Hz
or 1KHz of checkpointing, the storage medium will quickly fill, and the overhead of check-
pointing will become a significant portion of the overall compute on the system. For such
requirements, a hardware assisted checkpointing solution would be appropriate. With an
observed maximum of 1.189x(Canneal 3 Thread 50hz) slowdown for checkpointing, and a
more common 1.05x slowdown this solution canbeusedwithout impacting the application’s
quality of service. The additional system resources and compute power required greatly de-
pends on the application in question. When comparing the current cost per core and cost
for additional memory versus that of a semi custom design with an external hardware based
monitoring device, this software based method will be a more likely solution.
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